Pink & the Animals

You must read the blog on Pink below and the article Thomas Pink on The ethics of humanity and its enemies – the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill before you read this.

The main point of Pink's article (certainly the one we might talk about in the exam) is that; 'given the almost universal academic scepticism about our possession of an actual ability or freedom to determine for ourselves' there is a danger that the ideas promoted by science and many philosophers, about what a human being is and the rights they have, will be redefined in a way that, for Pink, is threatening and dangerous.

His point is that if we come to see human beings as not having free will, as not being autonomous, not having any control over the course of their lives, then their worth, their 'value' seems to be less. Pink fears that this will mean that the vulnerable, the less able, the less skilled, the less productive, will be treated badly.

He also fears that this view of humanity as just another 'animal', just another lump of physical stuff, will encourage what he sees as dangerous genetic experiments.

This is another example of how philosophy and science have huge political implications.

You must read the article to get this. Here's another link to it on my website http://www.mrbrodie.com/Philosophy/Resources,_Essays_%26_Links.html

Hume's Compatibilism - a crisis!!

I'm currently reading this


http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-freewill/


Why don't you join me? :)


More later. Probably much later. What does this 'weekend' thing mean?


So far, we seem to have a problem because we agree with ... err ... Kant!!! :\  He describes Hume's account of moral freedom as a “wretched subterfuge” and suggests that a freedom of this kind belongs to a clock that moves its hands by means of internal causes. 


HOMEWORK


You must:

• read all of both Hume extracts
• read the text book to p328 'The Implications of Determinism'
• Listen to the Pink podcast (link below)
• read the Pink article (links below)
• Or FAIL.

Sartre & the Nazis

It is important to understand that ideas around free will and determinism have enormous political implications. If human beings are not autonomous - in charge of their own lives - then it becomes difficult to talk about morality or any conception of praise or blameworthy behaviour. It also becomes very difficult to say why human beings should have human rights as the whole notion of what a human being is seems to be in doubt. (See Pink and the Animals - I've put this on the web site as a .pdf here http://www.mrbrodie.com/Philosophy/Resources,_Essays_%26_Links.html  (find the Agent Smiths)

 - the original is - I'm too good to you people!! http://cornerstonegroup.wordpress.com/2008/10/22/a-gross-assault-on-human-nature-–-by-thomas-pink-reader-in-philosophy-kings-college-london/) 

Sartre had a largely deterministic or materialistic (materialism is very similar to determinism, but is associated with Marx which is why I use it here) view of humanity: his politics were based on Marxism, but he rejected Marx’s idea that ‘life determines consciousness’ believing instead that we choose our lives through the power of our free will: ‘consciousness determines life.’

The context of Sartre’s philosophy is key to understanding his position. Sartre lived through the second world war and fought the Nazi invasion of France. For someone who was aware of the horrors of the holocaust etc. a view that allowed a human being to excuse their behaviour on the grounds that it was determined - caused by prior events and outside their control, was unnaceptable. (Many Nazis attempted to excuse their crimes by claiming they were only following orders.)

Sartre’s comment that anyone who claimed their actions were determined was ‘scum’ is best understood in light of this historical context.

Jean-Paul Sartre: Existentialism & Libertarianism

Sartre was an existentialist. He believed that 'existence comes before essence'; this means that we are not born with a particular 'nature' but must 'create'  ourselves as we go along. We respond to our experiences of the world, but we are not determined by them, we are free to choose who we are and how we live. Sartre claims that 'man' isn't simply 'what he conceives himself to be, but he is what he wills.' (my emphasis).

Roughly speaking Sartre believes that the very nature of consciousness is what enables human beings to have free will. He thinks that being conscious of - being able to imagine the different possible futures that might come about from different actions, enables us to choose our path.

THE GAP: For Sartre, being conscious of the world seems to allow us to stand back from our lives and interpret them in different ways. This seems to open up a distance between our consciousness and the rest of the 'physical' world. This is what Sartre call 'the gap' and it is the gap that allows us to have free will. Easy.

Although sympathetic to Marx's political philosophy, Sartre reverses Marx's belief that 'life determines consciousness', claiming instead that 'consciousness determines life.'

Whereas Marx believed that the way we think about the world and how we act is determined by our experience of the world, Sartre believed that we choose our experience of the world by the way we think about our place and role in the world.

For Marx the world makes us who we are. For Sartre we make ourselves who we are, and by doing so we make the world. Because he thinks that human beings have free will Sartre can be described as a libertarian, but we should be clear that he is a libertarian for different reasons to Descartes and Thomas Pink.

COWARDS and SCUM

Sartre is rather hard on determinists, he says,

Those who hide from this total freedom ... with deterministic excuses, I shall call cowards. Others, who try to show that their existence is necessary ... I shall call scum.

He claims that there two kinds of 'beings': humans are 'beings for themselves', everything else, rocks, trees are 'beings in themselves.' (He doesn't mention animals!). More of this next year possibly, for now the fact that he thinks consciousness gives us free will is enough.

Please leave a comment if you've read this.

Dennett & Determinism

The bearded Mr Dennett says some very interesting things about free will in his excellent and highly recommended book 'Freedom Evolves'.

He thinks that free will is only possible at all in a deterministic and therefore regular and predictable universe. He thinks that human beings have evolved to a level of consciousness (a kind of highly advanced awareness of our surroundings) that enables them to anticipate and predict different possible outcomes from different choices of action. If I duck the stone will miss my head, if I don't it will hurt: these predictions, made possible by our experience of similar events and the predictability of our deterministic world allow us to avoid events that we could not have avoided if we weren't conscious. (A football cannot avoid being kicked).

So, even though we are subject to causation - we are part of the causal chain - causes do not affect us in inevitably, we can avoid some effects (the stone hitting us). To describe this situation Dennett coins the term 'evitability' - the opposite of inevitability. For Dennett this gives us a kind of free will.

This is a draft ... I'm still working on it.

Determinism

HARD DETERMINISTS (obviously not as hard as Joe) & Physicalists  think that free will is an illusion. They think that all the choices, decisions and actions of human beings are determined by prior physical causes. Just like the atoms that form the rest of the physical world we are subject to the forces of cause and effect, we cannot do other than what we do do: we are subject to causal necessity. We are no more in control of our lives than an autumn leaf tumbling on the wind. (Ooh, lovely image!) As Baron d’Holbach put it

“Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant ... he is unceasingly modified by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which he has no control, which necessarily regulate his mode of existence, give the hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. . . . Nevertheless, in despite of the shackles by which he is bound, it is pretended he is a free agent, or that independent of the causes by which he is moved, he determines his own will, and regulates his own condition.”

The problem that this brings about is that if we are without free will, then we cannot be held responsible for our behaviour. How can we justify praising or blaming anyone for anything if they could not have done anything else. Clearly this view has profound implications for our notions of morality and justice.

OUGHT IMPLIES CAN

The whole point of morality is that it implies a choice: we can choose to do 'the right thing'. We know that we ought to do the right thing. But it make no sense to say we 'ought' to do something if we have no free will? The word 'ought' implies that we can, but we can't! See?

Free the animals.

Podcasts for your listening pleasure

Physicalism:
http://www.philosophybites.libsyn.com/index.php?post_id=242858

Tom Pink on Free will
http://media.libsyn.com/media/philosophybites/PinkMixSes.mp3

Listen and pass :) ignore and fail :(

Hurrah! for Here's the Half Term Homework Come at last!

It's been a long weekend. And time is subject to perceptual variation. So bang on time is the promised homework. 


The following four questions / tasks (the bullet pointed bits) MUST be done (even if you're called Jake) by Monday 22nd February.

Seeing as you're getting so good, have a go at these. They will require some thought, I had to think about them, but that means little as I have fewer brain cells than you.

• What does a comparison of idealism and direct realism tell us about the difference between epistemology and ontology?

• Why does solipsism threaten both idealism and representative realism? What philosopher(s) might we turn to for an escape from solipsism and how might he help us?  

These are from the text book, p. 60, but are rather good: (I've got a bit of a hunch about Locke and primary / secondary qualities being in the exam - It is only a hunch and not inside information - unfortunately). 

• Say whether the following are examples of primary qualities, secondary qualities, both, or neither. Explain your thinking.

Heat	Velocity	Pleasure
Pain	Circularity	Colour
Existence	Mass	Atoms

• Describe and illustrate one epistemological distinction between primary and secondary qualities and one ontological one.

Doing Well!

I have to say, I think you're getting this Knowledge of the external world rather well, so far. But of course, I can't be certain!

Representative, Indirect Realism

This understanding of the way we perceive the world tries to get around the weaknesses of direct / naive realism by positing the idea of 'sense data' as intermediaries between the external world and and our perception of it.

The 'sense data' allow us to form a representation of the 'real' physical world. The 'sense' data are 'mind-dependent' and 'object-independent' they can exist when we are not currently perceiving the objects we are having sense data representations of (like in dreams or hallucinations) and they vary according to our perspective (perceptual variation or relativity) and circumstances. So hallucinations are occasions when sense data occur without any corresponding stimulus in the physical world. Similarly illusions are simply examples of the 'sense data' being unable to match up with reality accurately. Perceptual variation, is explained in the fact that 'sense data' are mind-dependent' rather than object dependent and therefore vary according the individual's different perspective or point of view on the world.  

Although this theory seems to describe the way people experience the world more accurately than the clearly flawed naive realism, it has some very obvious problems of its own.

First of all it is not at all clear what the relationship is between the physical world and the 'sense data' that it seems to give rise to in us. If the sense data can be inaccurate as in the case of illusions, or entirely erroneous as in hallucinations, then how can we be sure that sense data actually represent anything at all?

Once the direct link between the supposed real physical world and our perception of it is called into doubt then the extent to which our representations of that world are accurate seems open to doubt, and a position of extreme scepticism (that the real world doesn't exist at all) seems possible. Either that or you end up being an idealist like Berkeley, or mad like Scott. 

Direct Realism 'A conversation'

'How the world looks to me is how the world is. It's obvious. What I see out there is what's out there.'

'What about illusions?

'Wot about them?'

Don't they prove that how the world appears is not necessarily how the world is?

'Do what, son? 's jus' a trick o' the light, or summint, innit?'

'But, what about hallucinations or the problem of perceptual relativity. If you accept that even once your perceptions do not match 'reality' then subsequently it's impossible to have ontological certainty, surely.'

'Oo you calling Shirley? You cheeky muppet! I'll give you homological (sic) certainty, you pranny, take that!

'Ah, you are quite correct, sir, the impact of your fist upon my nose has caused me a direct and .. . to be continued ...

A more coherent defence of a form of direct realism is given by J.L. Austin. The text book mentions him, but doesn't do him justice. We must when we revise.

Sense Data Homework: Due Monday

Explain as fully as you can how 'Sense data' theories attempt to resolve the problems of naive direct realism. (Draw a diagram if you feel it necessary)

You should probably use the following terms in your explanation:

intermediary / intermediaries, mediate / mediation, represents / representation, mind-dependent / mind-independent, perceptual error, perceptual variation, subjective, objective.

And read the rest of the Russell (especially the bit about his cat!)

Christmas Philosophy ‘Ho Ho Ho’-mework!

I'm back on line and broadcasting from hick country! 
Hope you had a nice Christmas and will have a very happy and philosophically successful New Year! 
Here's the happy homework in case you haven't done it yet.


1. Explain Kant’s claim that ‘synthetic a priori’ knowledge is possible.  (plan below) 

2. Explain what is meant by a priori and outline one reason why the a priori is philosophically significant. (15 marks)

Here is the mark scheme to help you so your answer should be perfect!

Expect the following definitions:

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it is known prior to and/or independently of experience.

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it cannot be refuted without contradiction.

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it is justly known through understanding one or more self-evident propositions. Descartes notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ may be used to illustrate the notion of self-evidence. 

And one of the following reasons why the a priori is philosophically significant:

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because they are immune from sceptical doubts regarding the senses. Descartes’ methodological doubt and his deduction of the cogito could be used to illustrate this point.

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because they constitute what we know innately and therefore are crucial in explaining capacities we possess that would otherwise be inexplicable.

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because of what they reveal about the necessary structure of (our experience of) the world.

Unless a candidate answers both parts of the question they cannot achieve full marks.

3. ‘All ideas derive from the sense experiences which they copy.’ Discuss. (30 marks)

Expect the following discussion points:

• The claim sets a clear limit on thought and allows us to proceed without getting

distracted by empty metaphysical speculation.

• The claim reflects our experience of learning, where new ideas are acquired as we encounter new experiences.

• At least some ideas, (eg Hume’s example of a missing shade of blue, ‘4’) do not appear to derive from sense experience.

• Some ideas are best regarded as innate, (eg a Euclidean straight line, God).

• If all my ideas derive from my sense experience and all your ideas derive from your sense experience it follows that we can never share the same idea as we cannot have the same sense experience – reductio ad absurdum.

• If the claim is presented as a factual hypothesis then there is insufficient evidence to justify it.

• The theory implies that thinking involves the manipulation of mental images, sounds, smells, etc. This is psychologically implausible.

• The theory fails to appreciate the active power of the mind in shaping our experience.

• The theory inevitably degenerates into a solipsistic scepticism that it hasn’t got the resources to escape from.

• The theory has problems accounting for general terms or universals.

• The term ‘idea’ is ambiguous, (eg is ‘the cat sat on the mat’ one or more idea(s)?).

Candidates could usefully refer to individual philosophers, (eg. Hume, Locke,

Russell, Descartes) in order to illustrate their discussion.

Free Stuff!

If you go here, you can download loads of excellent summaries of all the stuff we've studied so far. Some of it I have given you (sometimes in edited form) but there's loads I haven't. Beware the powerpoints, some of which are a little confusing I think.

http://www.routledge.com/textbooks/philosophy/resources-as.asp

Kant!

Here is the marvellous Kant plan. Sorry I haven't added anything to it, but that's your job! I'm too busy packing my life into boxes.

Rationalism & Science & Maths & what you really think but don't even know yourselves!

We learned (didn't we?) that there is a strand of rationalist philosophy, that still just about persists, that wants to claim for philosophy, the kind of certainty that science and maths claims. It wants to be able to find the kind of 'objective' 'a priori', necessary truth that mathematical theories have, it wants to be able to do what science does and abstract 'universal' laws and principles from its observations. It wants to be able to say 'this is how things really are!' It wants to strip away appearance and uncover the 'reality' behind it.

Most of you seem to think that you think it can't do this. Most of you seem to think that you think there is no objective truth, but I don't believe you really think it. After all aren't claims like 'the Earth goes round the Sun' closer to being true than the claim that 'the Sun goes round the Earth.'? So doesn't that mean that science is getting closer to the Truth?

Do you really think that the only measure of truth is agreement? I don't think you really think that if we all agreed that eating custard creams prevented heart disease then it would be true that eating custard creams prevented heart disease.

I think you all really think that there is a 'way things really are'. 

But I don't.  So there.

Lots of new stuff!

I've put lots of new stuff on here this weekend so please take the time and trouble to read it carefully.  Some comments would be nice also.  Even if you think you understand something it is ALWAYS worth reading about it and going over again in your mind. 

WITTGENSTEIN'S, BEETLE, THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT & SOLIPSISM: SOME MORE THOUGHTS

We’ve had a little trouble with us, so I've written the following in order to think it through. I offer it here because sharing meaning is what it's all about! 

It's the idea of naming objects (naming sense impressions) that's the problem. Because we can't see into each other's boxes/brains, then if we were to  name a sense impression we would do so on our own. 

Imagine this (it’s a little like my sausage example, but has less distracting comic potential): Sam and I are looking at a watch and I say, “Sam, that’s a watch,” and Sam says, “I agree.” So we both attach the name ‘watch’ to the sense impression inside our heads. 

Now, what we have done is EXACTLY THE SAME as both agreeing that we each have a ‘beetle’ in our matchboxes, without being able to see them, because we can’t see inside each other’s head anymore than we can see in each other’s matchbox. 

The point is difficult to grasp this because when Sam and I are both looking at the watch, when I see Sam seeing the watch, I 'automatically' assume he is seeing the same as me. (I'm almost certain he is, but that's not the point here.) It's the 'seeing' that misleads us. 

Imagine the same situation if we were both blind. Although we could both feel the watch, hear it ticking etc. I don't think we would have anything like the same confidence that we both perceived the watch in exactly the same way. I think we would be much less likely to attach meaning to the object itself and much more likely to create that meaning in the language and behaviour that surrounded the object.

I think there's something about the act of 'seeing' that makes it seem very powerful in the way we understand the world around us, (that's probably why I draw so many diagrams.) 

The ‘meaning’ of watch is not attached to the object, but is in all the things we ever say and do with the watch. 

Imagine a society, perhaps in the future, where people have developed a pretty accurate inbuilt sense of what the time is. They are a very laid back relaxed kind of people and think that the few people who are still obsessed with time and still wear watches are at best old-fashioned and at worst insane. In such a place the meaning of ‘watch’ would be quite different. Wouldn’t it? Think how the question ‘Do you wear a watch?’ would be different. So the meaning of ‘watch’ is not attached to the object but to the language use that surrounds it. 

So the naming of sense impressions in our heads, the naming of beetles in boxes, is without meaning. We have to forget 'naming' sense impressions as giving meaning and see that meaning only comes about through language use. 

Does that help? Comments please.