Thursday, October 20, 2011

Kant



Kant’s Synthesis 




‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.’
With this thought, Kant attempts to bring together the apparently opposed ideas of empiricism and rationalism. He synthesises their views in the claim that empiricism was right to say that experience, in the form of sensory perception (intuitions to Kant) is essential to knowledge, but the rationalists were right to say that the mind’s ‘rational’ structures make our understanding of those sensory perceptions possible by imposing the (‘pure intuitions’ of time and space and the ‘categories’ of: 
quantity: (unity, plurality and totality); 
quality: (reality, negation, limitation); 
relation: (inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and reprocity): 
modality: (possibility and impossibility, existence and nonexistence, and necessity and contingency) 

Without these organising structures experience itself would not be possible. We are so built, he thinks, that we have to experience the world outside ourselves as spatial and temporal (flowing through time) not because the outer world is spatial and temporal, but because we impose spatiality and temporality on the 'intuitions' we have of it.

Copernican Turn
It is in this sense that Kant’s philosophy represents a ‘Copernican turn’, rather than the world somehow imposing understanding of itself on our minds, our minds impose our understanding on the world - our minds give the the world the form we perceive it as having.
However, according to Kant, it is not the actual world 'in itself' that we perceive, this is beyond our perception; what we experience is the world of 'phenomena', the underlying reality behind the world we experience the world of 'noumena' is forever hidden to us. 

Kant’s Synthetic a Priori
Kant believed that claims about the world could be both 'synthetic' in that they could tell us something about the world that isn't contained in their own terms, and 'a priori' because they can be known independent of experience of the world. 

This is a response to Hume who had denied such a possibility. 'Hume's fork' (see previous entry) made a strict separation between synthetic propositions, which for him could only be known 'a posteriori' and 'analytic' propositions which could be known a priori, but told us nothing about the world that was not already contained in their terms. 

To understand this we have to look at the way the sentences we use to make propositions and claims about the world work. Sentences consist of subjects (the thing the sentence is about) and predicates (the words that say something about the subject). So, the sentence ‘Some frogs are green’ has ‘Some frogs’ as its subject and ‘are green’ as its predicate. 

Both Kant and Hume thought that 'analytic' statements are those in which the subject contains the predicate and consequently they don't add any information about the world: an example of this would be the sentence ‘green frogs are green’, or to push it a little further, 'kangaroos are animals', because we could claim that the concept of 'kangaroo' contains the concept of 'animal', so if we already have the concept of 'kangaroo' we already have the concept of 'animal' and we know this independent of (further) experience', we know it 'a priori'. 
On the other hand the predicates of 'synthetic' statements are not contained in the subject, so they do give us additional information about the world; for example ‘This frog is green’ or 'this kangaroo has a stamp collection.'
But Kant thought that statements like '7 + 5 = 12' were both 'synthetic' and 'a priori', in fact he thought that 'Mathematical judgments are all, without exception, synthetic.' For Kant, there is nothing contained in the concept of '7' and '5'  that makes the knowledge that adding them together will result in '12' immediately obvious or ineluctable. What he was getting at is perhaps easier to see if we consider larger numbers like for example, 38976 and 45204; their sum 84180 certainly does leap out at me, but I'm v. poor at maths. I think this gives an inkling of what Kant meant, but an awful lot of reading is really required to work your way into his idea. 

Kant also thought that science could come up with synthetic a priori statements. He claimed that the statement, 'In all changes in the physical world the quantity of matter remains unchanged.' was such an example; he said;
Now, in  thinking the concept of matter I do not think its permanence but only its presence in the space that it fills. Thinking that matter is permanent isn’t like thinking that women are female, or that tigers are animals. In judging that matter is permanent, therefore, I go beyond the concept of matter in order to add to it something that I didn’t think in it. So the proposition isn’t analytic but synthetic; yet it is thought a priori. He also claimed that the statement, 'When one body collides with another, action and reaction must always be equal' was synthetic and a priori. 

Again it is not obvious (not to most mortals anyway) exactly what he meant, but if we consider his ideas about the 'categories': how we experience the world in the way we do because time, space and cause and effect are built in to the way our minds are set up to experience the world, then we begin to see how we might know 'a priori' the stuff above about action and reaction, and such 'knowledge' certainly seems to add to our information about the world and is therefore 'synthetic'. Hume, of course denied that ideas about cause and effect, action and reaction etc. were anything other than the product of experience and as such, although synthetic, could only be known 'a posteriori'.
Causation is another example of synthetic a priori knowledge Kant claims that ‘Every event has a cause’ can be known a priori and is synthetic because it tells you something that isn’t contained in the terms: event is not synonymous with cause - depends how you think about it really!?:/ 

So, I hope that's clear, now. Another Saturday afternoon bites the dust of metaphysical speculation. 

Sunday, May 23, 2010

Some of my revision notes: Knowledge of the External World

Spent all day yesterday revising! Here are the beginnings of my notes: I can't put anymore on here now or I will be divorced! Do the rest yourself & Free Will and Determinism in a similar manner - pick out the main points and write a notes around them, then we will scoot through them on Monday!! :)

Remember the whole point of this unit is in the title - how do we have ‘Knowledge of the External World’? 
Direct naive Realism: The world is as I perceive it - my perception exhausts reality - I get all there is to get - nothing remains hidden behind a ‘veil of perception’. 
Defeated by illusion, hallucination, perceptual variation & physics - reality is not as we perceive it.
Philosophical Direct Realism: J.L. Austin - illusion occurs externally at the level of the object; refraction is a fact of the physical world that we perceive correctly. (Barn / Churches)!   Hallucination is more problematic, but can be distinguished because it is ‘anomalous’ (Homer Simpson behaving sensibly). 
Representative Realism - Russell - Sense Data:  To solve the problem of perceptual variation etc. Russell argues that as what I perceive changes and the object clearly doesn’t change I am not perceiving the object. So he suggests ‘sense data’ as mental phenomena that mediate between the external world and my perception of it. 
Against this we could say that perceptual variation / relativity is only a problem if you think it is somehow possible that there could be an ‘absolute vantage point’ - a ‘God’s eye view’ of an object that was somehow over and beyond any single perspective yet encompassing all possible perspectives.  If not we should just conclude that perceptual variation is just a physical fact of how objects (and us) are in the world. There is no need to invent a separate kind of thing to called ‘sense data’ perspectival relativity. 
A Working Hypothesis and a Map
Remember that Russell only claims that his theory is  Working hypothesis  but he suggests that because we are able to have conversations about the ‘external world’ then it is reasonable to claim that are ‘sense data’ correspond’ to it - at least to the extent that a map corresponds to the terrain it represents. This might lead us to talk about Wittgenstein’s beetle and the way meaning is actually in the use of public language.  
How does the mental connect with physical? The other problem for Russell is that his ‘sense data’ are ‘mental’, so he has the ‘dualists’ problem of explaining how the mental interacts with the physical. 

Saturday, May 22, 2010

I'm Revising R U? :?

Sounds like you're still in with a chance after Friday's exam. Revision is vital. Don't just read the book. Make notes - mind maps - answer the Q.s - do the essay I set. 

On Monday we will have to do Free-will & Determinism - so finish 'Knowledge of the External World and get on to that. 

I might be able to do after school on Monday as well.

I will blog on the former at some notes at some point this weekend but I'm struggling to come up with 'Battleships 2'! 

Remember you can search last years blog at http://philosophylogblog.blogspot.com/


Saturday, May 15, 2010

Battleships & Conceptual Schemes



Think about the game of Battleships - only imagine a real ocean. Think about how the grid, (which incidentally uses Cartesian co-ordinates invented by the man himself!) that we lay over the ocean in order to specify positions, is a kind of conceptual scheme.  
For example the position 'D - 5' specifies a 'point' on the ocean: we can know where it is, we can talk about what's there or isn't there, we could arrange to meet there. But the point does not actually exist in a meaningful way without the conceptual scheme. If the conceptual scheme didn't exist then no-one could swim to point D - 5 - they might accidentally arrive there, but they wouldn't know they were there and nor would anyone else. No conversation could be had about point D - 5 if the conceptual scheme did not exist.
So where did the conceptual scheme come from? It didn't come from the ocean itself - obviously! We invented it. The same can be said about any other 'reference' (word) we use to indicate a 'bit' of the world: colours, smiles, yes even board pens. 
So, if the conceptual scheme is invented (keep thinking battleships grid) then it doesn't seem to have much of a connection to 'reality'.   Knowing where point D - 5 is, is a piece of knowledge, but that knowledge seems to have no connection with the 'reality' of the ocean. Innit! 
Of course, this isn't the case with Kant. If we think of Kant's 'categories' as a conceptual scheme - and it's perfectly reasonable to do so, then we'd have to take into account the fact that because the categories are 'built in' to the rational structures of our minds, because it is only through those rational structures that we can have experience at all, then we might have to conclude that the conceptual scheme is reality. 


I hope, this will help with the question below.  I gave it my best shot. No pun intended. 



Revision (V. serious - No jokes can be made!)

To what extent do conceptual schemes threaten to cut the link between knowledge and reality? Discuss.

1. Explain idea of conceptual scheme
2. Explain Wittgenstein’s idea about how language use creates meaning - the meaning’s in the language use not the object ( maybe contrast Locke)
3. Explain how this might be understood as threatening the link between 
4. Now do a similar job for  Kant!  

Definition of conceptual scheme: A conceptual scheme, is a network of concepts and propositions by which we organise, describe, and explain our experience. 


Also: 

Explain and illustrate (give examples) two ways in which it is possible to have a priori knowledge.
Anticipate the following explanations:

Use this MARK SCHEME to put an answer together (You're not expected to know ALL this stuff.

Candidates may associate a priori knowledge with rationalism and there may be references to Plato, Descartes, Kant and/or to the (classical) empiricist view that such knowledge is trivial. There is likely to be some description of a priori knowledge as knowledge held before, or independently of, experience (or, perhaps, justifiable independently of experience) and this may be further developed in terms of logical necessity, innate knowledge, analytic statements and necessary truths (there is likely to be some blurring here). Accept any two of the following:

Intuition: rational insight, grasping the truth of a proposition, ‘seeing’ it to be true by ‘the light of reason’ (or, possibly, having a clear and distinct idea that...). This might be connected to logically necessary truths;

Through understanding the meanings of terms in analytic statements which are true by definition (or in which the concept of the predicate is contained within the subject). This may also be linked to necessity;

There may also be references to synthetic a priori knowledge (Kant and mathematics) and/or to contingent a priori knowledge (Kripke);

Deduction or demonstration: deriving further conclusions from intuited or necessarily true premises through valid argumentation;

Innate knowledge: knowledge not learned through either sense experience or intuition and deduction (Plato, learning as remembering).
Illustrative examples may be drawn from the literature, although this may depend on which points are made:

The laws of logic: eg whatever is green all over can’t also be red all over; 

Descartes’ clear and distinct ideas – which might be linked to innate ideas, intuition or demonstration –  (SEE THE CHART I GAVE YOU THAT YOU ALREADY HAD)
that, eg God can be known to exist a priori, the internal angles of a triangle = two right angles, etc; 

Hume’s 3 x 5 = half of 30; or, if injustice is defined as the violation of property, where there is no property there can be no injustice;

Kant’s view that the truths of mathematics – eg that 7 + 5 = 12 – are a priori, necessary and synthetic (and, possibly, that moral principles are a priori);

•    Plato’s view that mathematical truths are recalled (with some prompting) – the slave boy in the Meno or an equivalent example eg of how beauty is grasped; 

The claim (cf Kripke) that, eg ‘a gobbit = 1000 bits’ is a priori and contingent; • Various truths claimed for all logically possible worlds or any other proposition which illustrates a point

(expect references to bachelors and spinsters).

NB no marks are available for critical/evaluative accounts although relevant knowledge and understanding in such accounts should be rewarded.


Saturday, May 8, 2010

READ, REVISE OR DIE!!!! (metaphorically at least!)

If you have any interest in succeeding in the exams you must revise properly and thoroughly throughout the next 2 weeks. You have to do this independently and not just rely on me to tell you what to do.

Normal students (the ones you are competing with) are spending hours a day revising. (That isn't a joke) and you cannot possibly hope to compete with them if you don't.

For the 'Why Should I be Governed' unit you must finish reading the text book. Read the 'Lacewing' that I gave you (available for download on the website) and listen to the podcasts.

If you do these things you can do well.

Big Blog on Government to make up for lack of time in class due to time-wasting by wasters of time.

Why Should I be Governed?
The point of this unit is to look at  the philosophical foundations of political systems: how can we justify the very idea of having a government that can force people to follow laws they may not agree with? 
We must remember that government is not a natural phenomena; governments have been created by people.  We may feel far removed from the ideas and communities that shape our politics, but we’re not; political institutions are continually evolving and we all help to shape them. If politics doesn’t seem very real just watch the riots going on in Greece currently. 
Legitimacy & Authority: what gives government the right to govern?
We need to understand the way political theories have tried to justify and ‘ground’ the right of governments to govern.  
We need to ask: 
how have ideas about human nature shaped our political institutions?
what makes power legitimate? (what gives someone or some people a the right to claim power over others?)
what is the difference between being ‘in authority’ and ‘an authority’? (basically the difference between having power and having ‘wisdom’ or expertise) (See Jake for alternative interpretation) 
how might we justify acts of disobedience and dissent against a government if we don’t like what they do? 
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathon
We began examining these ideas and questions through through Thomas Hobbes’ famous book, Leviathon. We saw how Hobbes, writing during the English civil war, a period when ideas about legitimate power were up for grabs, tried to justify the idea of having a powerful leader, a ‘leviathan’, to keep people in order. (He wrote it in France just in case it upset anyone - which was easy to do and potentially fatal at that time!)
Man in the ‘State of Nature’ A Pre-societal Situation
Hobbes grounds his ideas about government with an account of the way he feels people would behave without government or society of any kind.  He thinks that people in this ‘natural condition’ before any kind of society (pre-societal) would be more or less ‘equal in the faculties of body and mind’, but rather than suggesting that this would make people co-operate he thinks it would mean that ‘the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest’, even if they have to get together with other ‘weaklings’ and sneak up on the strongest person to kill them. What’s more he thinks that people in this situation would be quite happy to do someone else in if it was to their own advantage.
Hobbes believes that,
From this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they can-not both enjoy, they become enemies;
In other words because we are roughly equal, we see everyone else as competition and so we are bound to ‘quarrel’ 
Hobbes distinguishes;
‘three principal causes of quarrel. First, com- 
petition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory. 
He tells us that,
‘The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation.’ 
In other words:
  • We fight each other to get stuff.
  • We fight each other because we don’t trust or care about each other.
  • We fight each other because we do care if people don’t respect us. 
Hobbes characterised all this nastiness amongst people in the ‘natural condition as a ‘war of every man against every man’ So Hobbes’ view of human nature is rather bleak and pessimistic. 
Social compact
We saw how Hobbes believed that despite all this unpleasantness men’s reason would allow them to recognise the first and ‘fundamental law of nature .. which is: to seek peace and follow it.’  They would recognise this because it would represent their best chance of survival as in the ‘state of war’ there is ‘no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain,’ in other words there’s no point building a shelter as someone will kick you out of it pronto! He also says there would be; 
no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society;
Nothing in fact but lots of bundles. (Aggro! as we used to say in the 70’s)  (Violence!)  
So the rational thing to do is ‘to seek peace’, and from this first law of nature a second law follows: ‘that a man be willing, when others are so too, [to] be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.’ In other words you give up your right to interfere with others if they give up their right to interfere with you. In making this kind of agreement you entering into a contract; Hobbes says ‘The mutual transferring of right is that which men call contract.’ 
Hobbes believed that given the selfish and competitive nature of humankind the only way such a contract could be guaranteed was for it to be overseen by a powerful leader who could punish any who broke it.  He thought that ‘nothing is more easily broken than a man's word’ but that we might keep this contract ‘from fear of some evil consequence upon the rupture. 
This leader is HobbesLeviathan’;  the Leviathan is both an embodiment of the people (see the picture from the front of the book, the ‘frontispiece’) and a great power above the people. It represents the combined power of all the people and through this power it overpowers those individuals who break the compact not to harm others.   
Although Hobbes was against the hereditary principle by which Kings were born not chosen, he  believed that the most effective form of leadership was some kind of monarch or dictator. 
Hobbes is most famous for suggesting that without such a ruler the life would be ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.’ 
John Locke
We read the first four chapters of Locke’s ‘Second Treatise on Government’ and saw that his view of the way people would behave in ‘the state of nature’ was a little different to Hobbes’.  Locke’s ideas are informed by his view of human beings as having a capacity for reason and his belief in God, which is perhaps a little surprising after studying his empiricist epistemology. 
Locke believed that ; 
The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions;
So Locke thinks that being rational creatures we should come to recognise the ‘law of nature’ that we all share basic equality and rights. He believes that these ‘natural laws’ are universal and apply to all people regardless of place or circumstance.  His view is bound up with the belief that; 
‘men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; ... sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another’s pleasure.’
It’s as if because God made us he owns all the rights to us and therefore we have no right to interfere with each other.  This principle of owning things because you have worked to produce them is important to Locke, and we’ll come back to it below. (In the his ideas about property - have you washed your Dad’s car yet Sam?)
For Locke the big problem of living in the state of nature is the lack of someone unbiased and independent to help you preserve and exercise your these natural rights. The answer to this problem is to trade your right to judge and punish those that break the natural laws through a contract with others that establishes a government to act as a defender of your rights and judge any disputes that may occur. 
Locke says, ‘in the state of Nature every one has the executive power of the law of Nature’ but that it is ‘unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases [because] self-love will make men partial to themselves and their friends.’ Therefore ‘civil government is the proper remedy for the in- conveniences of the state of Nature, which must certainly be great where men may be judges in their own case’.
It is in the act of contracting with others that - agreeing the social contract - that we show our consent to be governed.  And it is through our consent that the government can claim legitimate authority.
As ever things aren’t really that simple because the initial agreeing of the contract is a largely hypothetical idea, certainly it is pretty irrelevant to us that a ‘contract’ was made way back when. Of course there have been thousands of real contracts, real laws agreed between people and government over the hundreds of years since what we recognise as government came into being, and many of those laws still shape our lives. But what Locke and other ‘social contract’ theorists are interested in is the original justification of the very idea of having a system of government and law enforcement at all, and what must be the case for that government to claim to be legitimate.
Of course Locke realised that the legitimacy of a government’s authority could not rest on this original act of consent, but he believed that by living in a society and accepting the advantages that it gave us we were in effect giving our consent. This kind of consent he called tacit consent’ and it is very important concept in political philosophy. The extent to which we might agree that we have given our consent to a government depends on the extent to which we feel we have any choice about participating in the facilities it provides. After all we don’t really individually opt to take advantage of the schools or healthcare the government provides, our parents make that decision for us; and the possibility of opting out, of abandoning the society of our birth is not very easy. 
Hume mocked the idea of tacit consent, he compares it to the situation of someone ‘press-ganged’ into the crew of a ship, he says,
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or artizan has a free choice to leave his country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to day, by the small wages which he acquires? We may as well assert, that a man, by remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.

Hume’s basic point is still relevant even in contemporary societies where ‘peasants’ often have more economic power and opportunity for travel than he envisaged. 
Anyway, getting back to the point, Locke’s view differs from Hobbes’ in that he sees humankind as capable of recognising the ‘natural’ rights of others. He sees the point of making a social contract as being a way of mutually defending and preserving these rights.  Hobbes sees the contract as a means of basic protection from other people - a way of ensuring that we are free to build our lives and our communities free from the state of war that would exist without it. 
A Note about Locke and Property
As we saw above, Locke makes a lot of the idea that we are God’s ‘workmanship’, suggesting that the ‘work’ of creating us establishes his right of ownership of us. Locke seems to extend this principle of owning things because you have worked to produce to people, claiming that; 
As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common. 
Locke places three conditions on property rights, he suggests that;
1) one may only appropriate as much as one can use before it spoils (Two Treatises 2.31)
2) one must leave “enough and as good” for others (the sufficiency restriction) (2.27)
3) one may (supposedly) only appropriate property through one's own labor (2.27).
These ideas are highly contentious (people are still arguing about what he really meant), they’re not too important for us yet, but I just thought I’d mention them. 
Jean Jaqcues Rousseau
We read Chapter 6 of Rousseau's The Social Contract and saw how he thought that in the state of nature people would be naturally compassionate towards one another; that they would have a natural aversion to seeing others suffer. 
However, despite this positive disposition towards their fellow beings, Rousseau thought that human beings were rather limited on their own - their intelligence and real potential only begins to be fulfilled once they enter in society with others. Through facing difficulties alone people would begin to form associations with each other. 
In other words although people wished no harm on others they were quite happy getting along as fairly solitary 'noble savages' until they faced problems like paucity of resources (not enough or not good enough food, shelter, defence etc.), then they to get together.  He puts it like this:
I SUPPOSE men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. That primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. 
Now, Rousseau believed that no-one has natural authority over any one else, and that Legitimate authority comes only from agreed conventions. So he needed to come up with a form of social contract that seemed to embody the idea of no-on having more authority than anyone else while still establishing an authority that could tell people what to do! He writes;
"The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before." This is the fundamental problem of which the Social Contract provides the solution.

(This gets a bit abstract!!)
Hopefully you can see his solution: he thinks that if everyone gives up all their individual rights to everyone else then 'each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself,'. (This sounds rather like Rawls - see below)
Rousseau thinks that this will mean that the conditions and laws of the society constructed on this principle will be fair and reasonable because no-one has any interest in making them harsh. (Because you'd only be making things harsh for yourself.) (This is a little reminiscent of Rawls).
This coming together and mutual pooling of rights creates what he calls the general will, which is like the sum total of everybody's interests:
Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we see each member as an indivisible part of the whole.
Thus forged together through this social contract the people form a state or republic and collectively as the 'body politic' they are their own sovereign power. 
This sounds all very well, but it does have some drawbacks. For example in Chapter 7 'The Sovereign' Rousseau points out that 'The Sovereign, being formed wholly of the individuals who compose it, neither has nor can have any interest contrary to theirs;' this means that whatever the Sovereign thinks is good for you is good for you because really it's you that thinks it's good for you! (Mmm!) 
This leads to Rousseau's rather worrying conclusion that, 
whoever re-fuses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the whole body. This means nothing less than that he will be forced to be free'.
Another justification for this is that Rousseau believes that human beings, although basically good, are weak: we have desires and instincts that can lead us to do things that are not good for us.  By getting together and becoming part of the 'general will' we are made to do the things that are good for us, so we are able to properly develop our potential as human beings in a way that we could not in the state of nature, or in a society where we were forced to accept the will of a tyrant.   
Deontological arguments about the way we should act and how our societies should be governed are based on notions of rightness or wrongness. Something can be considered right or wrong through a religious belief or rational ‘insight’. So you could say that it's wrong to steal because God says so, or it's wrong to steal because as a rational being we should recognise that we all have the right to property that we earn through our labour. 
A teleological argument is more to do with the way things function (will society work if we do this?) would say that it's wrong to steal because if everyone stole everybody else's stuff then it would it would be impossible for human beings to function efficiently and fulfil their potential and therefore society could not progress. 

Monday, April 5, 2010

'Portant Podcasts

Assuming you've all got iTunes you should go here:
http://itunes.apple.com/gb/podcast/philosophy-the-classics/id254465298

And download the following:

Listening priority: 1) Hobbes, 2) Locke, 3) Rousseau, 4) (Plato - not arrowed), then both 'Mill's.


6 weeks 3 days to exams!!!!!!!!!

Don't panic!!!! :/ :\ :|

I have put all the 'Lacewing' handouts on 'Why Should I be Governed?' in a single document on my website here http://www.mrbrodie.com/Philosophy/Units_%26_Themes.html simply click on the yellow fish (not the yellow fish below) and choose the pdf or word version. You MUST READ all of this PROPERLY & THOUGHTFULLY! We will not have time to go over it in lessons because there's other stuff to do apart from finding time for revising the other units. 

I suggest you download it and print it, then make notes on each section. If you use the 'word' version you can highlight etc. on screen, but printing it is still probably better.

There will be more to do later this week. I'm afraid this bit's up to you - have fun!

Thursday, March 25, 2010

And even More Homework!

  • How might the Schacte & Singer Experiment support a compatibilist view?
  • Would you accept that the participants in the second experiment were ‘free’ and ‘responsible’?
  • Is the knowledge we receive also a physical force? 
  • Does knowledge determine actions? 
Ryle
How does Ryle’s example of the Chess game help us understand the different ways of interpreting ‘causal laws’?  (Due Friday)

Friday, March 19, 2010

The 'Jake Clause' does not apply here! (no stripy jumper 'get-outs' available)

We desperately need to finish this module off by middle of next week, so that we can dash through the last one and still have several minutes left to revise before the exams!!!:/
So, by Tuesday you must:
  • read very carefully p. 329 - 336 in the text book and make sure you have listened to both podcasts linked below. Then you'll be able to answer to answer some excellent Q.s in the lesson on Tuesday.
  • Finish answering the 'compatibilism' Q (below in previous post) if you haven't already.
  • Answer the questions below (we started these in Friday's lesson, but if you were doing fizzicks or being a malingerer (look it up Joe) you'll still be able to do them if you read the text book (as above) v. carefully and have  bit of a think.
  1. Could a society that completely accepted the idea of (hard) determinism and physicalism, justify the use of praise, blame and responsibility? 
  2. Dysfunctional, or psychologically damaged individuals can still have free will.  Explain how a determinist a compatibilist and a libertarian might responsd to this statement.
  3. Explain and illustrate (give an example) the principle of ought implies can. 
You may have noticed that I'm trying to get you to write more (Will will tell you why :)) 

The point is the more you are able to think things through for yourself and the more you practise writing in a methodical 'philosophical' way, then the easier it gets even if you are not completely sure of the exact details of every 'ism' and philosophical concept. Once you can play the game you can 'blag it' a bit - that's what I do - had you noticed? 

Unfortunately you can't 'blag it' if you really don't know what you're doing. 

Thursday, March 18, 2010

More Homework:)


This needs more than a scribbled paragraph to do properly. I know it's a teachers' cliche, but you're doing it for your benefit not mine. Every moment spent thinking / writing philosophy is a step towards a better grade. And vice versa. 


Q. How would compatibilists (soft determinists) reconcile causal accounts of character with free uncoerced actions?
In other words How can a compatibilist make sense of the idea that someone is a product of physical causes and yet can still have free will?

Monday, March 15, 2010

Vital Homework except for those named Jake and wearing stripy pullovers

Free Will & Determinism

  1. Why do neither theories of ‘randomness’ or quantum physics support the libertarian case for human beings as self-determining  / autonomous agents?
  2. How does Cartesian dualism account for free will? And how does Gilbert Ryle’s notion of ‘the ghost in the machine’ attack Descartes’ claim? 
  3. Explain Sartre’s idea of ‘the gap’ - what it is and how it allows for free will. 
  4. Why might it be true to say that Sartre’s emphasis is on the future?
  5. Why does Patricia Churchland attack libertarian attempt to find ‘causal vacuums’ as ‘flat earth’ philosophy? 
Also I've put a lot of stuff on here recently that I think will help you get some of these ideas straight. Please read it. Above all you must listen to theses podcasts:
Thomas Pink on Free will at  http://cdn1.libsyn.com/philosophybites/PinkMixSes.mp3?nvb=20090516103152&nva=20090517104152&t=05fb3f41be06ea130b9b1


and David Papineau on Physicalism at  http://www.philosophybites.libsyn.com/index.php?post_id=242858

Sunday, March 14, 2010

Thomas Pink: Compatibilism & Libertarianism

Thomas Pink says some very enlightening things about free will in his podcast with the lovely Nigel at http://cdn1.libsyn.com/philosophybites/PinkMixSes.mp3?nvb=20090516103152&nva=20090517104152&t=05fb3f41be06ea130b9b1

He explains how for compatibilists actions need a 'goal' or purpose to make sense as actions rather than meaningless events. (The difference between a muscle twitching a leg that moves a foot that impacts your leg and me kicking you because you are idle). He suggests that goals or purposes only make sense if they have a prior cause. This view is very similar to Hume's.

For me, compatibilism makes sense if you see actions and choices and decisions as events on a timeline:

> CAUSE empty belly (physiological)> EFFECT hunger > Should I have a chocolate biscuit or a carrot? (social conditioning etc. influences / determines? my CHOICE > my GOAL or purpose is either to stay slim and gorgeous or enjoy the chocolate biscuit and I imagine those possible futures as I decide > ACTION I eat a biscuit. My biscuit eating is a result of my choice, my choice gives it a goal and purpose and makes my ACTION intelligible (understandable) as an act of free will which forms part of a 'causal chain.'

So, for compatibilists, free will: choices and decisions, only make sense as part of this chain. Without the causes, the prior events that inform my choices and my goals, free will would seem meaningless and randum, as if it had nothing to with my life.

However, Thomas Pink thinks that we 'can have uncaused intelligible actions' (my emphasis). He says that 'action involves a self direction at a goal' and that 'the goal is provided by the very content of the mental event of choosing.' and in that sense it is 'internally generated'.

For Pink, choosing is about putting options and choices before 'the mind's eye' and then directing your yourself at the option or goal you choose.

Although he claims to be a compatibilist, he admits that he is closer to a libertarian position. I think he is a libertarian really.

Talk of a 'mind's eye' worries me (homunculous alert!), and I don't think Pink's position is all that convincing philosophically, but I want to believe him because I think politically I ought to be a libertarian.