Determinism

HARD DETERMINISTS (obviously not as hard as Joe) & Physicalists  think that free will is an illusion. They think that all the choices, decisions and actions of human beings are determined by prior physical causes. Just like the atoms that form the rest of the physical world we are subject to the forces of cause and effect, we cannot do other than what we do do: we are subject to causal necessity. We are no more in control of our lives than an autumn leaf tumbling on the wind. (Ooh, lovely image!) As Baron d’Holbach put it

“Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant ... he is unceasingly modified by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which he has no control, which necessarily regulate his mode of existence, give the hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. . . . Nevertheless, in despite of the shackles by which he is bound, it is pretended he is a free agent, or that independent of the causes by which he is moved, he determines his own will, and regulates his own condition.”

The problem that this brings about is that if we are without free will, then we cannot be held responsible for our behaviour. How can we justify praising or blaming anyone for anything if they could not have done anything else. Clearly this view has profound implications for our notions of morality and justice.

OUGHT IMPLIES CAN

The whole point of morality is that it implies a choice: we can choose to do 'the right thing'. We know that we ought to do the right thing. But it make no sense to say we 'ought' to do something if we have no free will? The word 'ought' implies that we can, but we can't! See?

Free the animals.

Podcasts for your listening pleasure

Physicalism:
http://www.philosophybites.libsyn.com/index.php?post_id=242858

Tom Pink on Free will
http://media.libsyn.com/media/philosophybites/PinkMixSes.mp3

Listen and pass :) ignore and fail :(

Hurrah! for Here's the Half Term Homework Come at last!

It's been a long weekend. And time is subject to perceptual variation. So bang on time is the promised homework. 


The following four questions / tasks (the bullet pointed bits) MUST be done (even if you're called Jake) by Monday 22nd February.

Seeing as you're getting so good, have a go at these. They will require some thought, I had to think about them, but that means little as I have fewer brain cells than you.

• What does a comparison of idealism and direct realism tell us about the difference between epistemology and ontology?

• Why does solipsism threaten both idealism and representative realism? What philosopher(s) might we turn to for an escape from solipsism and how might he help us?  

These are from the text book, p. 60, but are rather good: (I've got a bit of a hunch about Locke and primary / secondary qualities being in the exam - It is only a hunch and not inside information - unfortunately). 

• Say whether the following are examples of primary qualities, secondary qualities, both, or neither. Explain your thinking.

Heat	Velocity	Pleasure
Pain	Circularity	Colour
Existence	Mass	Atoms

• Describe and illustrate one epistemological distinction between primary and secondary qualities and one ontological one.

Doing Well!

I have to say, I think you're getting this Knowledge of the external world rather well, so far. But of course, I can't be certain!

Representative, Indirect Realism

This understanding of the way we perceive the world tries to get around the weaknesses of direct / naive realism by positing the idea of 'sense data' as intermediaries between the external world and and our perception of it.

The 'sense data' allow us to form a representation of the 'real' physical world. The 'sense' data are 'mind-dependent' and 'object-independent' they can exist when we are not currently perceiving the objects we are having sense data representations of (like in dreams or hallucinations) and they vary according to our perspective (perceptual variation or relativity) and circumstances. So hallucinations are occasions when sense data occur without any corresponding stimulus in the physical world. Similarly illusions are simply examples of the 'sense data' being unable to match up with reality accurately. Perceptual variation, is explained in the fact that 'sense data' are mind-dependent' rather than object dependent and therefore vary according the individual's different perspective or point of view on the world.  

Although this theory seems to describe the way people experience the world more accurately than the clearly flawed naive realism, it has some very obvious problems of its own.

First of all it is not at all clear what the relationship is between the physical world and the 'sense data' that it seems to give rise to in us. If the sense data can be inaccurate as in the case of illusions, or entirely erroneous as in hallucinations, then how can we be sure that sense data actually represent anything at all?

Once the direct link between the supposed real physical world and our perception of it is called into doubt then the extent to which our representations of that world are accurate seems open to doubt, and a position of extreme scepticism (that the real world doesn't exist at all) seems possible. Either that or you end up being an idealist like Berkeley, or mad like Scott. 

Direct Realism 'A conversation'

'How the world looks to me is how the world is. It's obvious. What I see out there is what's out there.'

'What about illusions?

'Wot about them?'

Don't they prove that how the world appears is not necessarily how the world is?

'Do what, son? 's jus' a trick o' the light, or summint, innit?'

'But, what about hallucinations or the problem of perceptual relativity. If you accept that even once your perceptions do not match 'reality' then subsequently it's impossible to have ontological certainty, surely.'

'Oo you calling Shirley? You cheeky muppet! I'll give you homological (sic) certainty, you pranny, take that!

'Ah, you are quite correct, sir, the impact of your fist upon my nose has caused me a direct and .. . to be continued ...

A more coherent defence of a form of direct realism is given by J.L. Austin. The text book mentions him, but doesn't do him justice. We must when we revise.

Sense Data Homework: Due Monday

Explain as fully as you can how 'Sense data' theories attempt to resolve the problems of naive direct realism. (Draw a diagram if you feel it necessary)

You should probably use the following terms in your explanation:

intermediary / intermediaries, mediate / mediation, represents / representation, mind-dependent / mind-independent, perceptual error, perceptual variation, subjective, objective.

And read the rest of the Russell (especially the bit about his cat!)

Christmas Philosophy ‘Ho Ho Ho’-mework!

I'm back on line and broadcasting from hick country! 
Hope you had a nice Christmas and will have a very happy and philosophically successful New Year! 
Here's the happy homework in case you haven't done it yet.


1. Explain Kant’s claim that ‘synthetic a priori’ knowledge is possible.  (plan below) 

2. Explain what is meant by a priori and outline one reason why the a priori is philosophically significant. (15 marks)

Here is the mark scheme to help you so your answer should be perfect!

Expect the following definitions:

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it is known prior to and/or independently of experience.

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it cannot be refuted without contradiction.

• A proposition or truth is a priori if it is justly known through understanding one or more self-evident propositions. Descartes notion of ‘clear and distinct ideas’ may be used to illustrate the notion of self-evidence. 

And one of the following reasons why the a priori is philosophically significant:

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because they are immune from sceptical doubts regarding the senses. Descartes’ methodological doubt and his deduction of the cogito could be used to illustrate this point.

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because they constitute what we know innately and therefore are crucial in explaining capacities we possess that would otherwise be inexplicable.

• A priori propositions or truths are philosophically significant because of what they reveal about the necessary structure of (our experience of) the world.

Unless a candidate answers both parts of the question they cannot achieve full marks.

3. ‘All ideas derive from the sense experiences which they copy.’ Discuss. (30 marks)

Expect the following discussion points:

• The claim sets a clear limit on thought and allows us to proceed without getting

distracted by empty metaphysical speculation.

• The claim reflects our experience of learning, where new ideas are acquired as we encounter new experiences.

• At least some ideas, (eg Hume’s example of a missing shade of blue, ‘4’) do not appear to derive from sense experience.

• Some ideas are best regarded as innate, (eg a Euclidean straight line, God).

• If all my ideas derive from my sense experience and all your ideas derive from your sense experience it follows that we can never share the same idea as we cannot have the same sense experience – reductio ad absurdum.

• If the claim is presented as a factual hypothesis then there is insufficient evidence to justify it.

• The theory implies that thinking involves the manipulation of mental images, sounds, smells, etc. This is psychologically implausible.

• The theory fails to appreciate the active power of the mind in shaping our experience.

• The theory inevitably degenerates into a solipsistic scepticism that it hasn’t got the resources to escape from.

• The theory has problems accounting for general terms or universals.

• The term ‘idea’ is ambiguous, (eg is ‘the cat sat on the mat’ one or more idea(s)?).

Candidates could usefully refer to individual philosophers, (eg. Hume, Locke,

Russell, Descartes) in order to illustrate their discussion.

Free Stuff!

If you go here, you can download loads of excellent summaries of all the stuff we've studied so far. Some of it I have given you (sometimes in edited form) but there's loads I haven't. Beware the powerpoints, some of which are a little confusing I think.

http://www.routledge.com/textbooks/philosophy/resources-as.asp

Kant!

Here is the marvellous Kant plan. Sorry I haven't added anything to it, but that's your job! I'm too busy packing my life into boxes.

Rationalism & Science & Maths & what you really think but don't even know yourselves!

We learned (didn't we?) that there is a strand of rationalist philosophy, that still just about persists, that wants to claim for philosophy, the kind of certainty that science and maths claims. It wants to be able to find the kind of 'objective' 'a priori', necessary truth that mathematical theories have, it wants to be able to do what science does and abstract 'universal' laws and principles from its observations. It wants to be able to say 'this is how things really are!' It wants to strip away appearance and uncover the 'reality' behind it.

Most of you seem to think that you think it can't do this. Most of you seem to think that you think there is no objective truth, but I don't believe you really think it. After all aren't claims like 'the Earth goes round the Sun' closer to being true than the claim that 'the Sun goes round the Earth.'? So doesn't that mean that science is getting closer to the Truth?

Do you really think that the only measure of truth is agreement? I don't think you really think that if we all agreed that eating custard creams prevented heart disease then it would be true that eating custard creams prevented heart disease.

I think you all really think that there is a 'way things really are'. 

But I don't.  So there.

Lots of new stuff!

I've put lots of new stuff on here this weekend so please take the time and trouble to read it carefully.  Some comments would be nice also.  Even if you think you understand something it is ALWAYS worth reading about it and going over again in your mind. 

WITTGENSTEIN'S, BEETLE, THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT & SOLIPSISM: SOME MORE THOUGHTS

We’ve had a little trouble with us, so I've written the following in order to think it through. I offer it here because sharing meaning is what it's all about! 

It's the idea of naming objects (naming sense impressions) that's the problem. Because we can't see into each other's boxes/brains, then if we were to  name a sense impression we would do so on our own. 

Imagine this (it’s a little like my sausage example, but has less distracting comic potential): Sam and I are looking at a watch and I say, “Sam, that’s a watch,” and Sam says, “I agree.” So we both attach the name ‘watch’ to the sense impression inside our heads. 

Now, what we have done is EXACTLY THE SAME as both agreeing that we each have a ‘beetle’ in our matchboxes, without being able to see them, because we can’t see inside each other’s head anymore than we can see in each other’s matchbox. 

The point is difficult to grasp this because when Sam and I are both looking at the watch, when I see Sam seeing the watch, I 'automatically' assume he is seeing the same as me. (I'm almost certain he is, but that's not the point here.) It's the 'seeing' that misleads us. 

Imagine the same situation if we were both blind. Although we could both feel the watch, hear it ticking etc. I don't think we would have anything like the same confidence that we both perceived the watch in exactly the same way. I think we would be much less likely to attach meaning to the object itself and much more likely to create that meaning in the language and behaviour that surrounded the object.

I think there's something about the act of 'seeing' that makes it seem very powerful in the way we understand the world around us, (that's probably why I draw so many diagrams.) 

The ‘meaning’ of watch is not attached to the object, but is in all the things we ever say and do with the watch. 

Imagine a society, perhaps in the future, where people have developed a pretty accurate inbuilt sense of what the time is. They are a very laid back relaxed kind of people and think that the few people who are still obsessed with time and still wear watches are at best old-fashioned and at worst insane. In such a place the meaning of ‘watch’ would be quite different. Wouldn’t it? Think how the question ‘Do you wear a watch?’ would be different. So the meaning of ‘watch’ is not attached to the object but to the language use that surrounds it. 

So the naming of sense impressions in our heads, the naming of beetles in boxes, is without meaning. We have to forget 'naming' sense impressions as giving meaning and see that meaning only comes about through language use. 

Does that help? Comments please.

R.F. Holland ('e durnt loike them ol' empiricist fellas!)

We read a 'characterisation' of empiricism by R. F. Holland from his book Against Empiricism: on Education, Epistemology, and Value, in which he alludes to three potential problems with empiricism. He believes that the empiricist account of the origin of ideas involves 'raw materials' entering the 'factory' of the mind in which they are 'processed and emerge cut and dried.' 

The notion of the 'mind 'processing' ideas seems to be beyond the explanations of empiricist theory; neither Locke nor Hume offer any detail on this 'process', but then how could they? Why would they? What does Holland want? Mmm..?

Holland also, perhaps more importantly, brings up what we might call the 'homunculus problem'. He characterises the empiricist theory of the way ideas spring from sense data as requiring a 'mind's eye' that 'surveys the products of its own efforts', as if a little man (homunculus) is required to look at the 'processed' sense impressions in order to make sense of them. This of course suggests another homunculus inside the first and so on into infinite regress. 

I think Holland is probably missing the point, but this is not the time to say why. His criticism is powerful. 

Holland also gently mocks Hume's notion of the 'pre-established harmony'  by which 'we find that our thoughts and conceptions have occurred in an order matching the order of events in the other works of nature.'  Holland is here referring to the apparent flaws in empiricist thinking that seem to lead to 'solipsism'. If we never 'advance a step beyond ourselves' as Hume suggests then how come we can reach agreement about the contents of our own minds?

Hume: some late notes as reminders

We saw how Hume, writing some 60 years later, builds on Locke's empiricist foundations and develops many of his views. Hume also rejects innate ideas and believes that all our thoughts are given through the senses.

Hume believes that;

we can divide the mind’s perceptions into two classes, on the basis of their different degrees of force and liveliness. The less forcible and lively are commonly called ‘thoughts’ or  ‘ideas’.

For Hume, these ideas are pale copies of the more direct and immediate perceptions we have when we are actually experiencing something rather than thinking about it. He calls these more direct perceptions ‘impressions’, and explains that he uses this term to mean, 'all our more lively perceptions when we hear or see or feel or love or hate or desire or will.'

So Hume thinks that ideas are got from the way we experience the world physically, emotionally and intellectually (although I'm not sure if he would approve of those divisions of our experience) but that all our ideas are 'fainter perceptions of ... our impressions.' As he puts it, 'all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones.'

Hume's Marvelous Method for Solving Philosophical Disputes!

As Hume believed that all ideas were faint 'copies' of the sense 'impressions' that they originated in, he was able to propose a method for solving certain philosophical problems by tracing the ideas these problems involved back to their original 'impressions'. If an idea could not be traced back to its original sense 'impression' then it must be empty, meaningless and not worth pursuing. 

I got you to try to apply this 'method' to the notion of  'a time when nothing happens'. This caused a lot of confusion and 'debate', but eventually we all agreed (I think) that because we could not have experienced a time when nothing happens, we cannot have a sense impression to base our idea on and therefore the idea was empty and meaningless. 

It is confusing because we 'think' we can imagine such a time, but we tend to imagine ourselves or someone 'observing' nothing happening, but of course the observation itself is something happening.

So we agreed that what we actually experience as 'time' is in fact change and 'time' as a 'substance' separate from change does not exist if Hume is correct. 

Locke's Primary & Secondary Qualities

We saw how Locke’s views on ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities emphasise his belief in the physical world as grounding the sense data that empiricism relies on.

Locke’s famous snowball has primary qualities of ‘solidity, extension, figure and mobility’, in other words it takes up a certain round space in the world, you can see it and if it hits you, you’ll feel it! These qualities are in the snowball itself and will not vary according to the circumstances of the person experiencing it: they are what we might call (although I don’t think Locke does) objective qualities.

On the other hand the secondary qualities such as colours sounds and tastes vary as the circumstances of the person experiencing the snowball vary: the first snowball to hit you feels colder that than the fifth, the colour and sound it presents to your senses varies according to when, where and how you experience it.

So, if Locke thinks that the objects in the real world have primary qualities that are independent of observers then he is a ‘realist’. He thinks the world is, and is in a particular way.

Homework for Sam (mainly)

How does Wittgenstein’s 'private language argument' show the problems with Locke’s view of language as naming sense impressions/ideas in the mind? 

I believe I've answered this below! But you may disagree.

Empiricism, Solipsism, Beatles, Boxes and Wittgenstein. Oh! and the Private Language argument too.

Some catching up is required - apologies - sometimes life gets in the way. 


So I've lumped together several things, all of which are very important and your grasp of them will be crucial to your success. They are quite difficult ideas because they are counter-intuitive - we're not used to thinking them, and so they tend to slip away if you don't keep going over the ideas in your mind. If my explanations aren't good enough for you there are lots of excellent resources on the internet, in particular the podcasts available at .......


Lets start with Wittgenstein. 


Wittgenstein asks us to imagine that everybody has a matchbox with a beetle in it (init?). No-one can see inside anybody else's box, but we all agree that what's in the box is 'beetle'. The point is that it doesn't actually matter what's in the box, we could all have different things, or nothing at all, as long as we 'play' the language game referring  to the things in the boxes as 'beetle' it doesn't matter. The meaning of the word exists in the 'language use' about the things in the boxes; the meaning is dependent on this community of language users. The meaning of the word does not depend on what's in the box, but on the language use in which it is referred to. The meaning is not in the 'label' that the mind attaches to the sense impression, it is in the 'negotiation' and interaction with other language users that the meaning comes about. 

This is most relevant for us because it sheds light on the empiricist idea that words name sense impressions that are 'sealed' inside the heads of individual observers, hidden away from everyone else just like the beetles. Because we cannot share the sense impressions, but we clearly share meaning, the meaning must be outside our heads in the use of language within our language community. 


The idea that we all name the same ideas inside our heads - that all our beetles just happen to be identical is clearly absurd. (well, when I say 'clearly' ...) Nigel Warburton in his excellent book Philosophy the Classics describes it like this;  

I have privileged access to the contents of my own mind that does not extend to the contents of yours. It is as if I have special access to a private cinema in which my thoughts and feelings are displayed; no one else has any idea of what happens within my private cinema. My experience is private to me, and yours to you. No one can really know my pain or my thoughts. I can describe my inner experience to myself, and no one else is able to judge whether or not my descriptions are accurate.

SOLIPSISM

Once you have fully grasped the notion of ‘sense impressions’ as things that exist inside the mind then it’s not difficult to see how empiricism falls into solipsism. 

Be certain you really get what is implied when Hume says,‘The mind never has anything present to it except the perceptions, and can’t possibly experience their connection with objects.’ 


Although Hume has little in common with him, it might be useful to think of this as a little like Plato’s ‘cave’ analogy. All the prisoners had were the shadows on the wall, they could not turn their heads or leave the cave to check the status of the shadows; it would never occur to them to do so because, to them, the shadows were reality. Similarly we cannot leave our heads to check how fully sense impressions mirror reality. 

Hume didn’t see this as problematic, but the kind of philosophers who want to find some objective ground, some ‘certainty’ beyond the particular circumstances of time and chance do. The kind of philosophers who want to escape the ‘cave’ and see the ‘reality’ behind the appearance, do. But Hume insists that, ‘We never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass.’  For Hume, we just are inside our heads with the ideas that are ‘dimmer’ copies of the original sense impressions. 

So if we are locked into our heads with our own individual sense impressions then how do we come to attach any meaning to the ‘ideas’ that the sense impressions leave us with? 

PRIVATE LANGUAGE

Wittgenstein's so called 'private Language Argument' makes  the point that a language that attempts to 'name' or give meaning to private sensations is impossible because it has no 'touchstone', no point of reference to keep its meaning consistent. This argument seems to rely on the very concept of 'meaning ' being almost synonymous (meaning the same thing) with 'sharing'.  If it isn't then you wouldn't need a 'touchstone'.  

If language is an intrinsically public phenomenon, and language sets the limits of our thoughts then the contents of our minds don’t seem as private as we might have believed.  Certainly it seems to make the notion of solipsism illogical. How can we define ourselves as solitary and locked in when the very use of the word shows us to be part of a language community.

If a private language is impossible then simply knowing a language refutes solipsism. We cannot be locked in if we are part of a language community and simply knowing a language confirms us as members of a language community. 

I'm beginning to repeat myself, so I'll stop.

You should be aware that this interpretation of Wittgenstein's views is known as the 'community view' for obvious reasons, it is not the only view, but it is the one that makes the most sense to me. (And Nigel, I believe.)